Marò sixteen. With the Division San Marco in Liguria, 1944-1945, by Sergio Moro
Driven by love of country, Sergio Moro, just sixteen, he enlisted a volunteer in the Royal Navy in 1943. But his dream is broken now with the widespread defeatism of many of his comrades, and the September 8, 1943, which will take in Pula. Captured by the Germans and then by Tito partisans, daring to be able to reach his family in Novara. His willingness to serve Italy will bring him back in the army, entering voluntarily perform in the San Marco CSR Division FM: After the meticulous and hard training in Germany, More, like his comrades, will be disappointed not to be sent to the front against the Allies, but will be deployed in Liguria in antisbarco function. The partisan struggle and inactivity in the Division principals wear out, but, as pointed out by Moor in his writing, in the darkest moment, that is in retreat to the north in April 1945, the Division will regain its compactness and efficiency combative , opening the road between the fiercely partisan forces who tried unsuccessfully to block the path of San Marco. After the surrender, Moro describes his imprisonment, including the harassment of the partisans and the harsh conditions of the POW Camp in cultivation, the homecoming, and dopoguerra.Brossura, F.to 14x21, 104 pages, 55 photos and documents in black, owned by the author, 4 color plates. € 15.00.
Here, the introductory note to the book Marò sixteen, Sergio Moro .
Today I'm scared of those historians who know they are always right and who claim to put the bolt and the wax seal in research considered taboo, the results of which has long been considered ESTABLISHED happily for the good of all. Ariel Toaff
From the memoirs of Marò Sergio Moro, with their simplicity and directness, it is clear bully a genuine love for the homeland, without rhetoric, and the balanced character of the writer, a man - a boy - who loves his family and his homeland, and he has done, sixty years ago, the choices that today seem extraordinary, but at that time represented the norm for tens of thousands of Italians. "Normality" of sacrifice and suffering, fear and courage, for which these Italians had no medals or awards, but if anything oppression and contempt, if they had played in the Italian Social Republic, or simply self-importance if they served in the Royal Army. Historiography, and more generally, almost all the Italian cultural intelligentsia relegated to a corner of the historical events and human resources of the Italian soldiers in World War II, became "Mussolini's war" to the benefit of those who had been - or had queued - in what would the vulgate as sole winner of the "war of liberation", the "resistance", and preferably that of common matrix. Even today, despite a belated and limited awareness on the part of the official history of participation (albeit marginal, and opposed by the Allies) of the Royal Army to the operations of the armed forces Allies in Italy in 1943-1945, it comes with great relief for the media, and even worse, institutional, diary Bruno Trentin, leading representative of the union and then a young anti-fascist, where the key phrase of the diary, which was delivered by his father to the proclamation of the Armistice, is: "Is the war begins! [That of "liberation", of course, Ed]. " Which is immediately echoed by the son: "The real war for Italy true." As if the thousands of Italians who died between the rocks of Greece, the snows of Russia, between the sheets of the wagons of Aries in the Libyan desert were not "real", they did not have families who mourn them, el'aver fought, without seeking anything, for their nation does not qualify them as "real" italiani.Tornando to memories of the Moro Marò, we want to do some reflection on the role played by the military division of CSR in the FM San Marco 1944-1945. The mainstream historiography presents the San Marco, and, more generally, the Republican National Army Divisions (ENR) as a unit which, after undergoing training in the impersonal and inhuman "Nazi Germany", returning to Italy met by hostility the "people on the run", are worn by the partisans, and break up shortly after with thousands of desertions in addition, do not fight against the Allies because of distrust of the Germans. The oral history, if collected by the historians of the left, fully agrees with this setting, clearly subordinate to the dictates ANPI: testimonies of soldiers - officers complement - the Republican National Army Divisions, brought to our attention years ago by a professor at the Faculty of History of Genoa, and collected in a research d ' Resistance imprint, in a monotone deprecated their comrades and officers, complained about the harsh conditions of training in Germany, his "depersonalization" and the German will "make of us automatons," and come in line were critical of the ration stations, the inadequacy of the equipment against dell'inclemenza time, etc.Inizieremo con il commentare i punti sollevati dalle testimonianze citate, chiudendo poi con delle considerazioni generali sulle testimonianze stesse, e sul ruolo della San Marco nel 1944-1945, ragionando non secondo i canoni della storiografia resistenziale o quella reducistico-apologetica dei “soldati dell’Onore”, ma sforzandoci di seguire un approccio obiettivo, storico militare.L’addestramento in Germania fu certamente duro, ma perché i soldati erano formati secondo la regola del “sudore salva il sangue”: l’addestramento doveva, per quanto possibile, replicare le reali condizioni di battaglia, integrando le lezioni apprese dalla Heer in anni di guerra, e inserite prontamente nei programmi d’istruzione. L’addestramento did not form "robots", at least not your derogatory-strength sources: the soldier must surely be conditioned to respond automatically, war a moment's hesitation in dealing with an emergency properly, or action with an effective 'weapon or equipment, could lead to serious consequences for the soldier and his comrades. Instead of "evidence" cited, veterans of the Divisions of the National Republican officers and troops, both through their statements, both in interviews and conversations collected by us, have always stressed the thoroughness of the training in Germany, in large field that allows for example to perform maneuvers with the entire division, even with the use of artillery media the opportunity to train with multiple departments, verifying the level reached in the coordination, communications, command and control, was almost totally unknown in Italy. Lieutenant Licitra, exploring Cadelo of Monterosa Group, said even he, already a veteran of several campaigns, in Germany only became aware of "how could the war," and that the German instructors, even for a train to pull hand grenades, they taught different techniques, depending on the position of the soldier and the target, etc.. Lieutenant Licitra well placed to benefit from the training Germany: April 26, 1945, in Ruta di Camogli, a gun against tank PAK 40 is part of a rearguard unit under his command managed to destroy an American M4 Sherman A4, and, together with the fire of the MG Bersaglieri Cadelo to block for several hours so the vanguard of a battle group of the U.S. 92nd Infantry Division "Buffalo" advancing towards Genoa. A feat of arms without a doubt smaller, but nevertheless indicative of the effectiveness of the Monterosa even combative in the last hours of the conflict. The experience of war was sent to recruit even the smallest detail: for example, the soldier was trained once in place "on earth", to have feet parallel to the ground, so that a bullet that passed grazing not hit the heel: a veteran of San Marco as his comrade back of a squad of riflemen who had not met this requirement, while the action was removed to heel net by a bullet that had failed rather than another Maro, on the same trajectory but with his foot in the position prescribed by the trainers tedeschi.Sempre about the "robots" is to be noted that the higher efficiency of the German, led the ' U.S. Army to activate a specific committee (Historical Evaluation and Research Organization), which recognized empirically, even with the use of mathematical models, applied to the reconstruction of a large number of clashes between Allied units, Soviet and German, increased fighting capacity, both in attack and defense, the soldiers of the Wehrmacht than their opponents. Then followed the studies of the Liddell Hart military historians, Martin van Creveld, Paul Savage, Richard Gabriel and Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, who analyzed in detail these results, confirming the latter. The training of Heer formed not only the officers but also non-commissioned officers, and to some extent also the troops, all'Auftragstaktik, ie take as part of the mission, personal initiative when it might be fruitful, even in absence of specific orders. Officers Italians who had fought alongside German units usually agree in stating as a junior officer or even a German NCO had experienced a range and tactical decision-making power in the field that was the prerogative only of the Royal Army officers italiani.Arrivando equipment Divisions of the National Republican Army, documents, namely the establishment and the balance of forces and weapons, give a picture quite different from that issued by publicist ideologically deployed: the orders of battle of the Divisions upon return from Italy of the units have good firepower, both in the Rifle Companies, both in arms d’accompagnamento e d’appoggio: le Squadre furono dotate delle eccellenti mitragliatrici MG 42, e distribuite pistole mitragliatrici MP 40 e MAB 38 A, i potenti cannoni controcarro da 7.5 cm PAK 40 garantivano finalmente una efficiente difesa contro i corazzati, assieme ai lanciagranate a carica cava Panzerfaust, etc. Il limite delle Divisioni dell’ENR di essere ippotrainate, era comune a tutte le Infanterie-Division tedesche, anche se, in effetti, la decisione tedesca di usare queste unità come reparti di presidio e sicurezza, quindi per compiti di seconda linea, condizionò in maniera negativa il completamento dell’equipaggiamento in alcuni settori.Tutto considerato, viene quindi da pensare che le testimonianze dei repubblichini mentioned have been carefully selected for their good agreement (in good or bad faith) with the clichés of the Resistance and that, in light of the circumstances described, are certainly not indicative of the morale and motivation of most of the components of the Divisions of Henry, and the less the efficiency of these combative unità.A about the desertions, taking into consideration the San Marco, it is undeniable that the dispersion in the cornerstones of the Division, the dripping of partisan ambushes, and the coldness of the population, fearful of reprisals from one and the other side, in addition to an inability to respond to the situation of some officers, led to a significant lowering of morale, and many desertions. On this subject we only two considerations, the result of the analysis of facts and not ideological preconceptions: the first is that in the face of these desertions, the vulgate presented as proof of the inefficiency of the Army Graziani, remains the indisputable fact and consequential, pure arithmetic, we would say that most of Marò instead stayed in his place, and indeed, in the last days of the war, in an atmosphere of heavy psychological and physical tension, the Division finally rank compact , demonstrated efficiency in the field fighting learned in Germany, overcoming several barrages of partisans fighting in the open field. This fact is undeniable and consequential, precisely, is unclear engagé ignored by historians and the like, or researchers, undergraduates, graduate students, journalists, etc.. that opportunistically prefer to not ask for a certain cultural hegemony, which provides career and in return prebende.Come corollary, we will quote as also by the Resistance are wisely ignored the desertions in partisan units, trumpeted the desertion of the Monterosa Vestone Battalion (and of course you avoid Vestone indicate how the department had an outside body, and that only fifty men remained with the partisans ) be opposed to the many ex-partisans - often simple draft evaders - there is authorities or the military units of CSR, especially after the call for amnesty, and were incorporated in the Armed Forces CSR: We report the ex-partisans in the Battalion resolved, or in the Decima MAS NP Battalion, who followed the department and the Southern Front in captivity, in the Battalion. Rust of the GNR, etc.In Secondly, look at the statistics on the defection of several infantry units of the 8th British Army in August-December 1944 (by Eric Morris, the unnecessary war, p.. 522): 1st Division: 6264 th Division: Second Division 66446: 1.05956 Second Division: Second Division 99078: 926Come we see figures of respect, and we consider that the British soldiers, although involved in heavy fighting, was clear that the Allied supremacy in the battle of matériel would lead them to victory soon. Moreover, unlike the British soldiers, the effects of armed forces CSR often operated close to their families, and a moment of weakness could easily push them to go home. In contrast, for a Tommy or a GI, the route from the Apennines to Bologna or Leeds Milwaukee was a daunting long way ... Finally, we are military importance of San Marco (and other units of the National Republican) under military historian of the war in Italy in 1944-1945. Obviously, the importance vulgata wants this to be zero, since the units are not used against Allies but deployed in Liguria, are then flaked by the partisan attacks and devote themselves only in retaliation against innocent civilians and partisans martyrs, blindly obeying the sinister Nazi occupation. The reality, when viewed objectively by a historical military is different. The Allied naval dominance, together with the air supremacy, had made possible a series of landings on the Italian coast: from landing in Sicily, including its subsequent landings Minor called End run, to try to impede the orderly German retreat to Messina, Salerno, Anzio up. For the German High Command was therefore natural to think that the Allies could groped for new landings, particularly in the north, behind the line face (and indeed of diversion landings were made in April 1945 during the final Allied offensive on the Senio). Consequently, in the second half of 1944 the Germans found themselves having to preside over both the north-western Italian is the eastern end arduous, with the means available to narrow the Heeresgruppe B: in fact, to hold the Allied troops landed at Anzio in January 1944, of the units sent to the emergency there was 715. Infanterie-Division, which was formed from pieces of artillery war booty by Russian 76.2 mm machine guns and infantry had spread to his largely French war booty, but also to choose 4. Fallschirm-Division lacked the entire Regiment d’artiglieria! Le unità dell’Esercito Nazionale Repubblicano permisero quindi ai Comandi tedeschi di poter liberare delle loro unità inviandole al fronte, impiegandole contro gli Alleati; e − diserzioni o meno − le GG.UU. dell’ENR eseguirono fino al termine della guerra la loro funzione di presidio (e non solo, considerate le numerose piccole azioni condotte sulle Alpi al confine con la Francia). Vista la superiorità numerica e in mezzi Alleata il poter inviare al fronte anche solo un paio di Divisioni, piuttosto che doverle tenere a scopo di presidio nelle retrovie, dovette rappresentare per i tedeschi un vantaggio operazionale notevole, e nuovo filo da torcere per gli Alleati nella loro lenta avanzata verso nord, where each meter was made to pay dearly for the veterans of the unit Wehrmacht.Inoltre even with restrictions, the Great Unity of Henry, or their rates, were then used at the front against the Allies in addition to the aforementioned operations on the Italian-French, briefly mention the participation of the San Marco and the successful operation of the Monterosa Wintergewitter Christmas in 1944, and Division of Italy to the defense of the Gothic Line. The Marò of San Marco and the Monterosa Alpine in particular had a good performance at the front, both in the harsh conditions of trench warfare, both during Wintergewitter, as demonstrated by the praise of the German command. We believe that these brief notes, despite their brevity, however, may be a track in order to study with more detachment - and in light of the facts and not dogmas - the military history of the Republican National Army Divisions.
Andrea Lombardi
